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An economic theory of foreign
interventions and regime change
Roberto Bonfatti University of Nottingham
Abstract. I construct a theory of foreign interventions in which a home country’s main trade
partner may influence the course of regime change. The foreign country intervenes in sup-
port of the group that draws the largest gains from trade, since such a group is willing to
concede most in trade agreements. But interventions are more than offset by the domestic
political system, which supports in power the group who concedes least (economic nation-
alism). I allow for geopolitical competition between the main trade partner and a second
foreign country, as well as for domestic ideological preferences over the two, and look at how
geopolitical competition interacts with the economic mechanism described above. My results
help interpret some of the patterns of Western interventions in the 20th century, and the
role of economic nationalism in regime change. Furthermore, they help explain why the Cold
War strengthened the West’s preference for incumbent elites, even when the oppositions did
not have a strong communist ideology. I provide detailed historical evidence in favor of my
arguments.
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1. Introduction.
One line space
The political economy literature has recently sought to understand the economic determi-
nants of regime change, and particularly democratization. However, work on this topic has
focused on the domestic determinants of regime change, whereas there has been very little
work on the role of foreign interventions.1 Still, historical evidence suggests that foreign
interventions played a key role in the 20th century. Cases such as Iran (1953), Guatemala
(1954) and Chile (1973) are classical examples, but there are many more.
Looking at Western interventions in the 20th century, three interesting patterns stand
out. First, the Western countries did not intervene at random around the world, but rather
I thank the editor, Hao Li, and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments, and Tim Besley,
Robin Burgess, Toke Aidt, Walter Mattli, Gerard Padro-i-Miquel, Dan Seidmann and Davide Ticchi for
useful comments. I also thank seminar participants at Oxford and the LSE, as well as conference partici-
pants at PEUK 2010, ISNIE 2010, and at the World Congress of the Econometric Society. Special thanks
go to Nathan Nunn for providing the data on CIA interventions. All remaining errors are mine.
1A notable exception to this is the seminal paper by Aidt and Albornoz (2011), which I discuss in detail
below.
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tended to focus on specific areas, often called their “spheres of influence.” Second, Western
interventions could often be rationalised by the fact that some domestic groups appeared
more willing than others to treat foreign investments generously, and, geopolitically, to
align themselves to the intervening country’s camp. This calls into question why did some
groups appear in such a way. Third, Western interventions often took place in countries
where economic nationalism - the wish to concede less to foreign investors - played a very
important role in motivating domestic revolutionaries, often as important as the redistribu-
tive motive emphasized by the literature on regime change.
I construct a theory that helps rationalise these and other interesting patterns from
economic fundamentals. There is a home country, H, where a challenger (c) can successfully
rebel against an incumbent (i) at a stochastic cost. To pre-empt this, i can either surrender
power, or unleash repression that makes revolution more costly. In the latter case, the
country’s main economic partner, F , and its geopolitical rival, E, may also intervene, to
make revolution more or less costly. If c goes to power, this leads to domestic redistribution.
In addition, whoever ends up in power can negotiate a bilateral agreement with F . I see this
as being mainly about the economy for H, mainly about geopolitics for F : for example, the
agreement may grantH access to F ’s market for its exports, in exchange forH’s geopolitical
alignment to F . The agreement is not just signed, but negotiated: so, it may be that, to
induce F to sign, H must concede rents to F ’s investors, or that, vice-versa, F must pay aid
to induce H to sign. As an alternative to an agreement with F , H may sign an agreement
with E, but this is suboptimal for H’s economy. Finally, I let i and c gain differently from
an agreement (for example, they may be differently involved in international trade), and
also have opposite ideological preferences over signing with F versus E.
In this setting, both agents sign an agreement with F , unless they have a strong ideolog-
ical aversion towards it. This makes E uninterested in regime change, and thus unwilling
to intervene. The first result, then, is that H should be an exclusive sphere of influence of
its main economic partner. Indeed, F may intervene in H in equilibrium, to support the
agent who, gaining more from an agreement, is willing to concede more to secure one. This
leads to a second result: involvement in the international economy determines which agent
concedes more to F ’s investors, and can then benefit from F ’s support. A third result is
that economic nationalism - the wish to concede less to foreign investors - should also be
an important driver of regime change, beside redistribution. For example, if c is the agent
who concedes less to F , then revolution is more attractive to c, repression less attractive
to i: they both like to have someone in power who concedes little. Comparative statics
reveal that the logic of the spheres of influence should become stronger in periods of greater
geopolitical tension, when, by threatening to sign with E, H can extract more of the value
of an agreement with F . Furthermore, the weight of economic nationalism should increase
with H’s gains from an agreement, and with inequality in the distribution of the gains from
an agreement.
I conclude by briefly outlining an extension fully developed in the working paper version
of the paper (Bonfatti 2015). If rents conceded in the past are hard to re-negotiate (for
example, because of reputation reasons), i may have an incentive to unilaterally concede
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rents to F , in order to secure more of its support in future political disturbances. Intuitively,
suppose c is not ideological averse to F , and thus potentially interested in signing an
agreement with this country. However, being relatively little involved in the international
economy, she is not willing to concede major rents. Then, if c goes to power, and finds
that large existing rents cannot be easily re-negotiated in the context of an agreement with
F , she may want to turn to an agreement with E instead. The logic of the spheres of
influence can then be broken, and F must scale up its support for i. Comparative statics
show that periods of greater geopolitical tension should be associated with more frequent
interventions by F against c, and with a lower probability of regime change, even if c is
not ideologically averse to F .
These results may help explain the three above-mentioned patterns of Western interven-
tions. They may also help explain why, in quite a few countries - such as Cuba (1959),
Nicaragua (1979), and Iran (1979) - regime change led to costly disruption in bilateral
relations with key trade partners. Finally, they may explain why, during the Cold War,
the West opposed, and effectively reversed, democratization in many developing countries,
despite the fact that the groups who would benefit from it were not clearly communist. I
discuss this historical evidence in an overview in Section 4, and in a few country studies in
Online Appendix A (available on the author’s website).
The paper contributes to the political economy literature on democratization. This can
be organized into two main strands. The first focuses on redistribution as a driver for
democratization (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), while the second shows that it may
be economically profitable for the ruling group to share power with a broader set of citizens
(e.g. Lizzeri and Persico 2004).2 I borrow the basic structure of the model from papers in
the first group, but innovate by looking specifically at the case of foreign interventions.
To the best of my knowledge, the only other paper to have attempted this before is Aidt
and Albornoz (2011).3 They look at the transition from elite rule to democracy, when the
elite, owning domestic capital that is complementary in production with foreign capital,
can be trusted to tax foreign investors less than the workers, and the country where foreign
capital originates can intervene to keep the elite in power. My paper differs from Aidt and
Albornoz (2011) in two key respects. First, I consider a different mechanism that makes one
group (not necessarily the economic elite) want to concede more rents than the other: while
they emphasize ownership of domestic capital that is complementary to foreign capital, I
look at dependence on an agreement with a foreign government. Second, I additionally look
at how geopolitical alignment is endogenous to regime change, in the context of geopolitical
competition between two foreign powers. Because of these differences, my paper generates
2For a detailed discussion of the literature on democratization, the interested reader is referred to
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). Alternatively, a very concise review of the literature using formal modeling
can be found in Ticchi and Vindigni (2008).
3Less related are two papers that consider how exogenous features of the outside world may affect the
probability of regime change. Acemoglu et al. (2010) focus on the role of the army in regime change, and
look at the impact of an external threat on the political equilibrium. Aidt, Albornoz and Gassebner (2012)
consider the case in which new regimes are granted welcome aid packages from foreign donors, and these
may exogenously differ depending on whether the new regime is a democracy or an autocracy.
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a series of novel results; it has a different empirical focus than Aidt and Albornoz (2011);
and it provides an alternative (or complementary) interpretation of some of their historical
evidence. I discuss these innovations in further detail throughout.
The paper is also related to an empirical literature that studies the determinants and
consequences of Cold War CIA and KGB interventions. Easterly, Satyanath and Berger
(2008; ESB) look at the impact of these interventions on democracy, and find this to be
negative in both the short and the long run. Dube, Kaplan and Naidu (2011) provide
evidence of unusual stock trading in American companies that would soon benefit from
classified CIA interventions, hinting at a close involvement of America’s top corporate
echelons in US foreign interventions. Finally, Easterly, Nunn, Satyanath and Berger (2010;
ENSB) find that countries intervened in by the CIA went on to import more from the US,
a sign that such interventions gave the US a good degree of influence over those countries.
My results are consistent with the findings of these three papers, and, as I explain in more
detail below, may help to interpret some of them.4
The paper is organized as follows. I present the model in Section 2, and solve for the
equilibrium in Section 3. Section 4 uses the model to interpret some of the patterns of
foreign interventions in the 20th century, referring to Online Appendix A for case studies.
Section 5 concludes, and discusses two possible extensions.
One line space
2. Model.
One line space
There is a home country, H, whose political regime is determined in a game with four play-
ers: two domestic agents (an incumbent, i, and a challenger, c), and two foreign countries
(F and E). Agents i and c can be interpreted as the “elite” and the “citizens” as in Aidt
and Albornoz (2011), but the model is more general. I interpret H as a small developing
country, and F and E as large developed countries. The game has two building blocks: a
model of regime change, and a model of international agreements.
One line space
2.1. Regime change.
While i is initially in power, c can stage a revolution. This is costly to c (more details below)
but always successful at overthrowing i. Before c decides whether to stage a revolution or
not, i can pre-empt this decision by surrendering power. I assume that, if i is indifferent
between surrendering power or not, it always surrenders it. If c goes to power - be it
through revolution or the surrender of power - redistribution takes place: i owns a share θi
of national income until he is in power, a share θc ≤ θi after c goes to power (throughout
the paper, I use subscripts to denote who is in power). I take the extent of redistribution,
θi− θc, to be exogenously given, and to capture the degree of appropriability of i’s income.
Revolution entails two costs for c. First, there is an exogenous cost, which is chosen
by Nature and borne by c upon staging a revolution. Using a standard notation in the
4Less related is a literature studying the efficiency implications of cross-border lobbying for domestic
trade policy formation (Endoh 2005; Aidt and Hwang 2008; Antras and Padro-i-Miquel 2011), which does
not consider the possibility of endogenous regime change.
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literature, I denote this cost by µ. The cost µ captures all exogenous factors (such as the
existence of a charismatic leader) that determine the severity of a group’s collective action
problem, and thus the difficulty with which it can rebel. It is drawn from a distribution
with p.d.f. f(.) and c.d.f. F (.), taking a value over the interval [M,M ] (with M < 0 and
M > 0, and |M |,|M | large). The negative portion of the support may capture the existence
of non-economic benefits from regime change, such as the achievement of redistributional
justice or of ethnic or religious goals.
Second, there is an endogenous cost of revolution, proportional to investment in repres-
sion by i, and to investment in foreign interventions by F and E. If i investsm in repression
(at a cost |m|), and F and E invest mF and mE in foreign interventions (at a cost |mF |
and |mE|),5 the cost borne by c upon staging a revolution becomes µ+m+mF +mE. In
equilibrium, it will always be m ≥ 0, but it may be mF R 0 and mE R 0: in other words, i
will only want to invest to make revolution harder (hence the term ’repression’), whereas
F and E may want to intervene both to make it harder and to facilitate it. A positive m
could capture the purchase of military equipment, the deployment of extra security forces,
or any other action that makes it harder for c to stage a revolution. A positive mJ (with
J ∈ {F,E}) could capture a case in which J supplies military equipment to i, a negative
mJ one in which J supplies this to c.
One line space
2.2. International agreements.
There is an international agreement that H can sign to increase its national income. In
particular, H’s national income is worth 1 if the country signs no agreement, but 1 + γ
(with γ > 0) if it signs an agreement with F . Such an agreement is also worth γF > 0 to
F . I interpret the agreement as having mainly economic value for H, but also geopolitical
value for F . For example, the agreement could grant H access to F ’s market for its
agricultural exports, in return for H’s geopolitical alignment to F . The latter may consist
in, for example, adopting a certain voting pattern in the UN, or conceding territory for F ’s
military purposes. As an alternative to an agreement with F , H can sign an agreement
with E. Without loss of generality, E is less good an economic partner for H; for simplicity
only, an agreement with E has no value for H. Such an agreement has, however, value
γE > 0 for E, which I also interpret as geopolitical value. So, F and E can be interpreted
as geopolitical competitors, in the sense that H’s agreement with one of the two reduces the
potential payoff to the other. I focus on the case γE ≤ γF : H is at least as geopolitically
important to its main economic partner, than it is to the third country.
If an agreement between H and J ∈ {F,E} is signed, a transfer r (from H to J) can
be used to redistribute the value of the agreement between the two. A positive r may
be interpreted as rents that H grants to J ’s investors, a negative r as aid that J pays.
Examples of rents are preferential concessions in the exploitation of natural resources, or
in accessing H’s consumer market. An increase in r by one unit results in a unit gain for
J , but in a cost φ ≥ 1 for H: this allows for distortionary rents, or for a credit-constrained
5I consider in Online Appendix B2 (available on the author’s website) the possibility that repression
and foreign interventions have a convex, rather than linear, cost.
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H (to whom aid is worth more than it costs). I assume that i and c share the costs or
benefits of r equally (and thus more equally than they share national income). This is a
reasonable assumption, given that many of the government policies affected by the transfer
will be redistributive in nature. For example, preferential mineral concessions may subtract
resources to the provision of public goods, or to the funding of poverty-alleviation programs.
Alternatively, preferential access for foreign investors may result in a higher cost of living
for everyone, hitting particularly hard on the poor. Of course, the assumption that φr is
shared equally is just for simplicity: all that matters is that it is shared more equally than
national income.
I also allow for ideological (non-economic) preferences over the signing of an agreement
with F versus E: i reports an extra benefit ξ from signing with F , whereas c reports an
extra cost −ξ. For example, in a Cold-War setting, with F representing the US and E the
USSR, ξ > 0 would capture the case of a pro-capitalist incumbent and a pro-communist
challenger, ξ < 0 would capture the opposite.
The opportunity to sign an agreement presents itself after it has been decided who rules
over H, and after any redistribution. The procedure to sign an agreement is as follows.
First, the ruling agent negotiates with F (a la Nash, with equal bargaining power) over a
transfer to be implemented if an agreement between H and F is signed. If negotiations suc-
ceed, the agreement is signed, and the transfer implemented. If negotiations fail, the agent
moves on to negotiations with E. These follow the same procedure as negotiations with F ,
except that if they fail, no further negotiations take place (and H signs no agreement).
One line space
2.3. Gross payoffs.
Payoffs (gross of any cost of revolution, repression and foreign interventions) are a function
of who ends up in power, as well as of any agreement signed and the related transfer. Let
W jq denote the gross payoff to agent j ∈ {i, c, F, E} when agent q ∈ {i, c} ends up in power.
Consider first agent i. If an agreement with F is signed, his payoff is:
W iq = θq(1 + γ) + ξ − φ
rFq
2
, (1)
where rFq denotes the transfer granted by agent q to F . The cost of the transfer, −φr
F
q ,
is divided by two, to reflect the assumption that it is shared equally between i and c. If
instead an agreement with E is signed, i’s payoff is:
W iq = θq − φ
rEq
2
, (2)
where rEq is the transfer granted by q to E. Finally, if no agreement is signed, i’s payoff is
simply W iq = θq. Next, consider agent c. If an agreement with F is signed, her payoff:
W cq = (1− θq)(1 + γ)− ξ − φ
rFq
2
. (3)
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If instead an agreement with E is signed:
W cq = 1− θq − φ
rEq
2
. (4)
If no agreement is signed, her payoff is W cq = 1− θq.
Finally, consider the payoff to J ∈ {F,E}. If H signs an agreement with J , such payoff
is:
W Jq = γ
J + rJq , (5)
while if H signs an agreement with −J , or if it signs no agreement, then W Jq = 0.
For domestic agents, regime change may imply up to three policy changes. The first is
redistribution, what the literature on regime change has so far focused on. The second
involves international agreements: i and c may choose different alignments. The third
involves the terms of an agreement: given a choice of alignment, i and c may negotiate
different r. For F and E, the last two policy changes are all that matters.
One line space
2.4. Timing.
The game has four stages. All actions are observed by everyone immediately after they are
taken.
1. Cost of revolution, surrender of power: Nature picks µ. Subsequently, i decides
whether to surrender power or not.
2. Repression and foreign interventions: if i has surrendered power, nothing hap-
pens. Otherwise, i, F and E sequentially6 set m, mF and mE.
3. Revolution: if i has surrendered power, nothing happens. Otherwise, c decides
whether to stage a revolution or not.
4. Redistribution, international agreement: if c is in power, redistribution takes
place. Otherwise, no redistribution takes place. Subsequently, negotiations for an
agreement take place. Finally, all payoffs realise.
One line space
3. Analysis.
One line space
I look for the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) of the game. This approach may seem
inconsistent, given that the Nash bargaining solution used to characterise the outcome of
stage 4 is a co-operative concept. However the justification for this approach is that, as
well-known (e.g. Mothoo 1999), the Nash bargaining solution can be rationalised as the
6One interpretation for why F moves before E is that H solicits foreign interventions from its main
economic partner first. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this. I discuss in Online Appendix B1
the possibility that i, F and E move simultaneously.
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outcome of a non co-operative Rubinstein-style bargaining game, in which the discount
factor goes to one. In particular, the specific Nash bargaining solution used in this paper is
equivalent to that of a sequence of two limiting Rubinstein-style games - the first between
the ruling agent and F , the second between the ruling agent and E - with the ruling agent’s
payoff in the latter game being treated as her disagreement payoff in the former game.
An alternative specification would be to treat the ruling agent’s payoff from an agreement
with E as her outside option in negotiations with F . While in the current specification
such payoff always matters for the outcome of negotiations with F (as shown below), in
that alternative specification it would merely generate a constraint on the minimum payoff
that the ruling agent must obtain in negotiations with F . Then, it would matter for the
outcome of negotiations with F only when the constraint is binding. One problem with
that alternative specification is that it relies on the assumption that the ruling agent can
credibly opt out of negotiations with F , to start negotiations with E. Given that F is H’s
natural counterpart in an agreement, and given that international relations may take time
to establish, this assumption may not be the most realistic. For this reason, I stick to the
first specification. However, I show in Online Appendix B that results are qualitatively
robust to adopting the alternative specification. In particular, the comparative statics
described below is unchanged.7
One line space
3.1. Stage 4. Redistribution, international agreements.
Suppose first that c has gone to power. Redistribution takes place. Then, c enters into
negotiations for an agreement. I begin by assuming that negotiations with F fail, and find
the outcome of negotiations with E. I then find the outcome of negotiations with F , using
the outcome of negotiations with E as c’s disagreement payoff.
Negotiations between c and E must succeed. This is because an agreement between
the two is joint-welfare increasing, and there exists a tool (rEc ) that the two can use to
redistribute the value of the agreement between themselves. Because the agreement is
valuable only to E, one would expect that this country will have to accept a negative
transfer (pay aid) if an agreement is to be signed. In fact, the Nash bargaining solution
transfer is:
rEc = argmax
r
(
−φ
r
2
) (
γE + r
)
= −
γE
2
, (6)
which is negative. The maximand is the product of c’s gain from an agreement and E’s
gain.8 Intuitively, the agreed-upon transfer is more negative, the more geopolitically impor-
tant is H (the higher γE): so, a country in a strategic position, or endowed with strategic
natural resources, is predicted to receive more aid. It is easy to see that c’s gain from an
agreement is φγ
E
4
.
7I thank the Editor, Hao Li, and an anonymous referee for useful suggestions on this point.
8Nash (1950) showed that if parties 1 and 2 negotiate over the choice of a utility vector (u1, u2) from a
convex set U , the unique solution having some desirable properties is argmax(u1,u2)∈U (u1 − d1) (u2 − d2),
where d1 and d2 are disagreement utilities.
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Turning now to negotiations with F , these must fail if c’s ideological aversion is so strong
that an agreement between the two is joint-welfare decreasing. This happens if:
(1− θc)γ − ξ − φ
−γF
2
< φ
γE
4
.
On the left-hand side is c’s gain from an agreement, if F surrenders its entire gain
(rFc = −γ
F ). On the right-hand side is c’s disagreement payoff. If the condition holds,
there is no way that F can induce c to sign an agreement, and negotiations must fail. The
condition can be re-written as:
ξ > (1− θc)γ + φ
(
γF
2
−
γE
4
)
≡ ξ.
Notice that ξ > 0: it takes a degree of ideological aversion for negotiations with the
country’s main economic partner to fail.
If ξ > ξ, negotiations with F must fail. If ξ = ξ, they can at best leave both parties as
well off as at their disagreement point: I assume that they fail in this case as well. If ξ < ξ
negotiations with F must succeed. To find their outcome, recall that c has disagreement
payoff φγ
E
4
. The Nash bargaining solution transfer then is:
rFc = argmax
r
[
(1− θc)γ − ξ −
r
2
− φ
γE
4
] [
γF + r
]
=
(1− θc)γ − ξ
φ
−
γF
2
−
γE
4
. (7)
The maximand in the first row is the product of c’s gain from an agreement and F ’s
gain, relative to a situation where c signs an agreement with E. The second row reports
the agreed-upon transfer. As simple algebra shows, the transfer is such that c and F split
the value of the agreement in half. Then, c concedes more, the more she gains from an
agreement (the higher (1− θc)γ), and the less important is H to F (the lower γ
F and γE).
This is intuitive: you would expect a ruler who is very involved in trade, and who sits in a
geopolitically irrelevant country, having to concede a lot to secure an agreement.
In summary, c signs with F if ξ < ξ, negotiating the transfer indicated in equation ??.
If instead ξ ≥ ξ, she signs with E, negotiating the transfer indicated in equation ??. It
can be shown that the transfer negotiated by c decreases continuously in ξ over (−∞, ξ),
turning from positive to negative: quite intuitively, the more c is ideologically averse to F ,
the less she concedes. It then jumps up at ξ, as c switches to a more ideologically attractive
agreement with E.
Policy if i has remained in power can be derived symmetrically. If:
ξ ≤ −θiγ − φ
(
γF
2
−
γE
4
)
≡ ξ,
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i signs an agreement with E, negotiating a transfer:
rEi = −
γE
2
. (8)
If instead ξ > ξ, he signs an agreement with F , negotiating a transfer:
rFi =
θiγ + ξ
φ
−
γF
2
−
γE
4
. (9)
Symmetrically to the one negotiated by c, the transfer negotiated by i jumps down at ξ,
and then increases continuously in (ξ,∞), turning from negative to positive. It is easy to
see that ξ > 0, ξ < 0.
Comparison of i’s and c’s policy reveals some intuitive patterns. When ideology is mod-
erate, ξ ∈
(
ξ, ξ
)
, both agents stick to the country’s main economic partner. However, if i’s
share of national income is high both before and after regime change (θi and θc are high), he
tends to concede more. Intuitively, high θi and θc imply that i goes to the bargaining table
having to gain more than c from an agreement, while the two share the costs or benefits
of the transfer equally. It is then not surprising that i is willing to concede more to secure
an agreement. Similarly, i tends to concede more than c if he is relatively more affine to F
(high ξ). Two interesting results stand out. First, if i’s share of national income remains
high after regime change (high θc), even a small ideological aversion makes c sign with E,
since ξ is small. Second, if H becomes more geopolitically important (a scaling up of γF
and γE), it becomes more likely for it to be aligned to F , since
(
ξ, ξ
)
expands. What drives
the latter result is that H can play the two foreign countries against each other only in the
first stage of negotiations (by threatening to sign with the other if negotiations fail), and
the first stage is assumed to be with the country’s main economic partner. If H becomes
more important, the value of signing at the first stage, and thus with F , increases. This
result suggests that periods of geopolitical tension should result in a tightening of alliances
based on economic relations.
I introduce the following parametric assumption:
One line space
Assumption 1. (1− θc)γ, θiγ > φ
(
γF
2
+ γ
E
4
)
.
One line space
Assumption 1 narrows the focus of the paper to the historically relevant case in which H
(a developing country) is more dependent on an agreement with F (a developed country)
than the other way around. In other words, γ is large relative to γF and γE. It implies
that, if ideology is moderate, both i and c concede rents to F : rFc > 0 and r
F
i > 0.
Substituting the above-derived policies into equations ?? to ??, we obtain gross payoffs
as a function of parameters. Let ∆W i ≡ W ic −W
i
i and ∆W
c ≡ W cc −W
c
i denote gains
from regime change to i and c respectively. In equations ?? to ??, I write these in a format
that highlights the three possible policy changes associated with regime change. The first
change, captured by the term (θi − θc)(1 + γ), is redistribution. It makes regime change
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attractive for c, and unattractive for i. The second change refers to the fact that i and
c may choose different alignments, and is captured by the underlined terms. It appears
only when ideology is extreme, because i and c both stick to F when ideology is moderate.
The third change refers to the fact that i and c may concede different r, and is captured
by the terms in square brackets (which are equal to φ ri−rc
2
). It makes regime change more
attractive for everyone, the more i concedes relative to c. This difference is larger the larger
are i’s ex-ante and ex-post income shares, θi and θc. It is easy to see that ri− rc ≥ 0 if and
only if ξ > 1−θi−θc
2
γ, the threshold level of ideology that offsets any difference in the two
agents’ gains from an agreement. Absent ideology (ξ = 0), the condition for i to concede
more is simply θi + θc > 1.
∆W i = −(θi − θc)(1 + γ)+


−θcγ − ξ +
[
θiγ+ξ
2
− φ
2
(
γF
2
− γ
E
4
)]
if ξ ≥ ξ[
θi+θc−1
2
γ + ξ
]
if ξ ∈
(
ξ, ξ
)
θiγ + ξ +
[
− (1−θc)γ−ξ
2
+ φ
2
(
γF
2
− γ
E
4
)]
if ξ ≤ ξ
(10)
∆W c = (θi − θc)(1 + γ)+


−(1− θc)γ + ξ +
[
θiγ+ξ
2
− φ
2
(
γF
2
− γ
E
4
)]
if ξ ≥ ξ[
θi+θc−1
2
γ + ξ
]
if ξ ∈
(
ξ, ξ
)
(1− θi)γ − ξ +
[
− (1−θc)γ−ξ
2
+ φ
2
(
γF
2
− γ
E
4
)]
if ξ ≤ ξ
.
(11)
Figure 1 (panel a) illustrates. For ξ = 0, both ∆W i and ∆W c are larger than redistri-
bution would justify. That is because i gains more from an agreement than c (the figure
assumes θi + θc > 1) and thus concedes higher rents. As ξ increases and i becomes more
relatively affine to F , the difference in rents increases, and ∆W i and ∆W c also increase.
For ξ very large, ∆W i drops, because i dislikes being derailed from an agreement with F
if c goes to power.
Figure 1 ideally here.
Before continuing, I introduce a second parametric assumption:
One line space
Assumption 2. θi − θc >
γ+φ
(
γF−
γE
2
)
2+γ
.
One line space
Assumption 2 requires redistribution to be a prominent driver of regime change, so that
∆W i < 0 and ∆W c > 0 always (proof of this is online Appendix B4). If redistribution was
small, i could be better off with c in power if c was able to concede a lower transfer.
I similarly derive the gains from regime change to F and E, ∆W F ≡ W Fc −W
F
i and
∆WE ≡ WEc −W
E
i , and write them in equations ?? to ??. Changes in alignment and r
are all that matters for the two foreign countries. As before, the change in alignment is
captured by the underlined terms, and appears only for extreme ideology. It makes regime
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change less (more) attractive for the country that the new regime switches away from (to).
The change in r is captured by the terms in square brackets, which, for J ∈ {F,E}, are
equal to rJi − r
J
c . It makes regime change less attractive, the more i concedes relative to c.
Figure 1 (panel b) illustrates. For ξ = 0, ∆W F < 0, since i concedes more than c. As ξ
increases and i becomes more relatively affine to F , this pattern is magnified. For moderate
ideology, regime change does not matter for E, since both agents stick to F . For ξ large,
however, ∆WE jumps up, as regime change results in a switch in alignment from F to E.
Notice that ∆WE > 0 implies ∆W F < 0, and ∆WE < 0 implies ∆W F > 0. Thus, when
both countries have strict preferences over regime change, these are opposite.
∆W F =


−γF −
[
θiγ+ξ
φ
− γ
F
2
− γ
E
4
]
if ξ ≥ ξ
−
[
2
φ
(
θi+θc−1
2
γ + ξ
)]
if ξ ∈
(
ξ, ξ
)
γF −
[
(1−θc)γ−ξ
φ
+ γ
F
2
+ γ
E
4
]
if ξ ≤ ξ,
(12)
∆WE =


γE −
[
γE
2
]
if ξ ≥ ξ
0 if ξ ∈
(
ξ, ξ
)
−γE −
[
−γ
E
2
]
if ξ ≤ ξ
. (13)
Summing across equations ?? to ??, I obtain the global gain from regime change, ∆W
(equation ??). Redistribution, which is just a transfer from i to c, does not matter for
“global preferences” over regime change. In contrast, any change in alignment (the under-
lined terms) matters: for example, it makes regime change less attractive when ξ ≥ ξ. This
is because regime change leads to a globally inefficient switch in alignment to E. Finally,
any change in r may also matter (the terms in square brackets are equal to (φ−1)(ri−rc)).
It does so when φ > 1, or rents are distortionary, since it is then efficient for the agent who
concedes more not to end up in power. The heavy line in Figure 2 illustrates. For ξ = 0,
∆W > 0, since i concedes more than c, and rents are assumed to be distortionary. As ξ
increases and i becomes more relatively affine to F , the difference in rents increases, and
∆W also increases. However, for ξ very high, ∆W drops, since regime change results in an
inefficient switch in alignment to E.
∆W =


−γ − (γF − γE) +
[
(φ− 1)
(
θiγ+ξ
φ
−
(
γF
2
− γ
E
4
))]
if ξ ≥ ξ[
(φ− 1) 2
φ
(
θi+θc−1
2
γ + ξ
)]
if ξ ∈
(
ξ, ξ
)
γ + (γF − γE) +
[
(φ− 1)
(
− (1−θc)γ−ξ
φ
+
(
γF
2
− γ
E
4
))]
if ξ ≤ ξ
. (14)
This discussion highlights that, beside redistribution, there are two new forces behind
regime change. The first, which I call economic nationalism, refers to the fact that i and c
like to concede as little as possible to foreign countries. It shapes domestic preferences in
favor of the strongest negotiator. If rents are distortionary, it even shapes global preferences
in favor of this agent. The second force, which I call international disruption, refers to the
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ξ(θi − θc)(1 + γ)
−(θi − θc)(1 + γ)
ξξ 1−θi−θc
2
γ
∆W i
∆W c
(a)
ξ
ξξ 1−θi−θc
2
γ
∆WE
∆WF
(b)
FIGURE 1 Gains from regime change when θi + θc > 1, φ > 1.
fact that regime change may sidetrack H from its efficient pattern of international relations.
It shapes global preferences against the agent who would sign with E.
One line space
3.2. Stage 3. Revolution.
If i has surrendered power in stage 1, nothing happens. Otherwise, c decides whether to
stage a revolution or not. It is optimal for c to stage a revolution if her cost is smaller than
her gain:
µ+m+mF +mE < ∆W c. (15)
Condition ?? proposes a modified version of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)’s revolution
constraint. As in that model, revolution is a threat when c’s exogenous cost of revolution,
as increased by repression (µ +m), is smaller than her gain from redistribution (included
in ∆W c).9 There are two new elements: foreign interventions (mF + mE), and the fact
that ∆W c also depends on economic nationalism and international disruption.
One line space
3.3. Stage 2. Repression and foreign interventions.
If i has surrendered power, nothing happens. Otherwise, i, F and E sequentially decide how
much to invest in repression and foreign interventions. Given these investments, if condition
?? holds, c stages a revolution. However, in equilibrium, c may stage a revolution also if
µ+m+mF +mE = ∆W c. For this reason, I now describe the SPE of the entire subgame
that starts after i has not surrendered power. I relegate the full description of the SPE
9Repression is modelled by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) in a different, but substantially equivalent
way.
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to the Appendix, and describe here only the equilibrium paths. Unless otherwise stated,
proofs are also in the Appendix.
One line space
Lemma 1. If i does not surrender power in stage 1, one equilibrium path is as follows:
• Stage 2. If ξ ≥ 1−θi−θc
2
γ (so that ∆W F ≤ 0, ∆WE ≥ 0), i, F and E set:
(m,mF ,mE) =


(0, 0, 0) if µ > ∆W c,E
(0,∆W c,E − µ, 0) if µ ∈ (∆W c,F,E,∆W c,E]
(∆W c,F,E − µ,−∆W F , 0) if µ ∈ (∆W,∆W c,F,E]
(0, 0, 0) if µ ≤ ∆W
(16)
where ∆W c,E ≡ ∆W c +∆WE and ∆W c,F,E ≡ ∆W c +∆W F +∆WE; if instead
ξ < 1−θi−θc
2
γ (so that ∆W F > 0, ∆WE ≤ 0), they set:
(m,mF ,mE) =


(0, 0, 0) if µ > ∆W c,F,E
(∆W c,F,E − µ, 0, 0) if µ ∈ (∆W,∆W c,F,E]
(0,∆W c,E − µ, 0) if µ ≤ ∆W and µ ≥ ∆W c,E
(0, 0, 0) if µ ≤ ∆W and µ < ∆W c,E
; (17)
• Stage 3. c stages a revolution if µ ≤ ∆W , does not stage a revolution otherwise;
and the game then moves to the bargaining phase of stage 4. For µ 6= ∆W , such a
path is unique. For µ = ∆W , there exists only one other, which is as follows. Stage
2: if ξ ≥ 1−θi−θc
2
γ, (m,mF ,mE) = (−∆W i,−∆W F , 0), if ξ < 1−θi−θc
2
γ, (m,mF ,mE) =
(−∆W i, 0, 0); Stage 3: c does not stage a revolution; and the game than moves to the
bargaining phase of stage 4.
One line space
The equilibrium paths described in Lemma 1 make intuitive sense. To illustrate, consider,
for example, the first path, and focus on the case ξ > 1−θi−θc
2
γ (when ∆W F < 0, ∆WE ≥ 0).
If µ > ∆W c,E, Nature’s cost of revolution is higher than the joint gain from regime change
to c and E. Then, revolution never occurs, not even if i and F do not repress/intervene.
Anticipating this, i and F do not repress/intervene, E does not intervene, and c does not
stage a revolution. If µ ∈ (∆W,∆W c,E], Nature has made revolution jointly optimal for c
and E, but still costly enough that i and F can profitably block it (by increasing its cost to
∆W c,E).10 There are two subcases. If µ ∈ (∆W c,F,E,∆W c,E], Nature’s cost of revolution is
high enough that, even by itself, F can profitably block a revolution. Anticipating this, i
does not repress, forcing F to intervene. If µ ∈ (∆W,∆W c,F,E], Nature’s cost of revolution
is too low for F to be able to block it by itself, and i must repress. However, he invests the
minimum required amount, still forcing F to intervene. Finally, if µ ≤ ∆W , Nature’s cost
10I show in the Appendix (Proposition A1) that, given these actions by i and F , it is an equilibrium
requirement that either c does not stage a revolution when at a tie (implying that it is strictly optimal for
E to set mE = 0), or that c does stage a revolution when at a tie, but E sets mE = 0 when at a tie. In
either cases, the actions of i and F are enough to block a revolution.
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of revolution is so low that i and F cannot profitably block it. They then neither repress
nor intervene, and c stages a revolution (with no need for E’s intervention).11
This first path is unique if µ 6= ∆W , but not if µ = ∆W . Intuitively, in the latter case,
i is indifferent between repressing or not, since successful repression costs exactly as much
as regime change. There are then two paths: one in which c does not repress (and c stages
a revolution) and one in which i represses (and c does not stage a revolution).
Lemma 1 suggests that, if i does not surrender power, revolution happens if it is efficient
(µ < ∆W ). On reflection, this makes sense. All agents are represented in the decision on
revolution, be it directly, as c, or indirectly through repression and foreign interventions,
as i, F and E. The linear investment technology then ensures that the revolution decision
is efficient.
One line space
3.4. Stage 1. Cost of revolution, surrender of power.
Faced with Nature’s choice of µ, i decides whether to surrender power or not. In doing so,
he anticipates that, if he does not surrender power, the subgame that follows features the
equilibrium described in Lemma 1. The equilibrium path of the overall game is unique,
and is described in the following proposition (the full description of the SPE is in the
Appendix):
One line space
Proposition 1. On the unique equilibrium path, if µ ≤ ∆W , i surrenders power in
stage 1, and the game moves directly to the bargaining phase of stage 4. If instead µ > ∆W :
• Stage 1. i does not surrender power;
• Stage 2. If ξ ≥ 1−θi−θc
2
γ (so that ∆W F ≤ 0 and ∆WE ≥ 0), i, F and E set:
(m,mF ,mE) =


(0, 0, 0) if µ > ∆W c,E
(0,∆W c,E − µ, 0) if µ ∈ (∆W c,F,E,∆W c,E]
(∆W c,F,E − µ,−∆W F , 0) if µ ∈ (∆W,∆W c,F,E]
;
If instead ξ < 1−θi−θc
2
γ (so that ∆W F > 0 and ∆WE ≤ 0), they set:
(m,mF ,mE) =
{
(0, 0, 0) if µ > ∆W c,F,E
(∆W c,F,E − µ, 0, 0) if µ ∈ (∆W,∆W c,F,E]
;
• Stage 3. c does not stage a revolution;
and the game then moves to the bargaining phase of stage 4.
One line space
In equilibrium, i surrenders power if and only if µ ≤ ∆W . Intuitively, if µ > ∆W and
i holds on to power, c does not stage a revolution, and, if any repression is needed, this
costs less than −∆W i. Instead, if µ ≤ ∆W and i holds on to power, either c stages a
11Intuitively, E’s intervention would have been necessary for a revolution only if i and F had re-
pressed/intervened.
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revolution, or (only if µ = ∆W ) the revolution is staved off at a cost −∆W i in repression.
Consistently with the lack of a political Coase theorem, the mechanism that regulates the
political transition is inefficient: if ∆W > 0, it would be efficient for all parties to agree on
peaceful regime change. Still, peaceful regime change does not happen if µ ≤ ∆W .
Notice that, if µ ≤ ∆W , i is, strictly speaking, indifferent between surrendering power
or not. It is then only because of the tie-breaking rule introduced in Section 2.1 that
he surrenders power. That tie-breaking rule implies that, in equilibrium, regime change
always happens through the surrender of power: in other words, revolution never happens.
This simplifying feature is common to similar models of regime change (see Acemoglu and
Robinson 2006, Ch. 6). It would be straightforward to modify the tie-breaking rule so
that, in equilibrium, regime change could happen through both the surrender of power and
revolution. If i’s tie-breaking rule was to surrender power with probability p ∈ [0, 1], regime
change would still happen when µ ≤ ∆W . However, when it would happen, it would be
through revolution with probability p, through the surrender of power with probability
1 − p. It is easy to see that the comparative statics discussed below would still hold true
for the probability of regime change, but it would also separately apply to the probability
of revolution, and to the probability of the surrender of power.
To interpret Proposition 1, suppose H is a Latin American country in the mid 20th
century, i an incumbent elite, c the citizens, and F and E the US and USSR respectively.
Consider first a benchmark scenario in which the international forces discussed in this paper
are inactive: international agreements are not important for the domestic economy (γ → 0),
the superpowers do not care about H’s geopolitical alignment (γF , γE → 0), and domestic
agents are not ideological (ξ = 0). The following corollary describes the equilibrium in this
benchmark scenario:
One line space
Corollary 1. If γ, γF , γE → 0 and ξ = 0, the equilibrium path converges to the
following. If µ ≤ 0, i surrenders power in stage 1, and the game moves directly to the
bargaining phase of stage 4. If instead µ > 0:
• Stage 1. i does not surrender power;
• Stage 2. i, F and E set:
(m,mF ,mE) =
{
(0, 0, 0) if µ > θi − θc
(θi − θc − µ, 0, 0) if µ ∈ (0, θi − θc]
;
• Stage 3. c does not stage a revolution;
and the game then moves to the bargaining phase of stage 4.
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 1 and equations ?? to ??, since ∆W → 0,
1−θi−θc
2
γ → 0, ∆W F → 0, ∆W c,E,∆W c,F,E → ∆W c, and ∆W c → θi − θc.
QED
One line space
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1−θi−θc
2
γ
∆W
∆W c,F,E
∆W c,E
FIGURE 2 Political equilibrium when θi + θc > 1, φ > 1
In the benchmark scenario, redistribution is the only force behind regime change. In
equilibrium, regime change happens if and only if Nature gives the citizens a low enough
cost of revolution (µ ≤ 0). Otherwise, the elite can successfully hold on to power, using
repression if needed (if µ ∈ (0, θi−θc]). One interesting finding is that higher redistribution
(higher θi− θc) does not make regime change more likely. This is because higher inequality
makes both revolution and repression more attractive, and these two forces cancel out in
equilibrium. This result is a special case of a similar result in Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006): see their Corollary 6.1, where inequality is found to have a non-monotonic relation-
ship with the likelihood of regime change. Notice also that the superpowers refrain from
interfering in the country’s political transition.
Now re-introduce international forces. In addition, suppose that the elite are landowners
who, even after redistribution, are more involved than the citizens in exporting to the US
(θi+θc > 1), and that the citizens may be relatively more “leftist”(on top of their preference
for redistribution) compared to the elite (ξ ≥ 0). Figure 2 represents the equilibrium.
Since ξ ≥ 0, we focus on the right-hand portion of the diagram. As in the benchmark
case, regime change happens if and only if Nature gives the citizens a low enough cost
of revolution (µ ≤ ∆W ). However, regime change is more likely than in the benchmark
case if the citizens are moderate leftists (since ∆W > 0), less likely if they are extremists
(since ∆W < 0). Intuitively, in the former case, the citizens are as good as the elite at
foreign policy - they efficiently sign with the US - but, being tougher negotiators, are able
to negotiate a better deal with the US government. Economic nationalism, then, makes
regime change more likely. In the latter case, the citizens cannot be trusted with foreign
policy, since they inefficiently sign with the USSR. Economic nationalism notwithstanding,
then, the fear of international disruption makes regime change less likely.
Figure 2 ideally here.
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A look at equation ?? sheds light on the comparative statics of regime change. Changes
in parameters that increase ∆W make regime change more likely, and vice-versa. Redistri-
bution, θi − θc, still does not matter for regime change, at least directly. However, higher
ex-ante and ex-post income shares of the incumbent (higher θi or θc) make the citizens
more likely to end up in power, because they boost economic nationalism. Then, we get
the surprising result that a higher θc, which ceteris paribus means lower redistribution,
is associated with a higher probability of regime change. Next, a greater importance of
international agreements (a scaling up of γ) makes moderate citizens more likely to end
up in power, because it boosts economic nationalism. However, because it also boosts the
fear of international disruption, it makes extremist citizens less likely to end up in power.
Finally, a greater geopolitical importance of H (a scaling up of γF , γE) makes extremist
citizens less likely to end up in power. Intuitively, a greater prominence of international
relations benefits a challenger who can be trusted with foreign policy, penalises a challenger
who cannot.
If the elite holds on to power, it may do so using repression (in the starred area) and/or US
interventions (in the gray area). If the citizens are moderate, the US supports the elite for
purely economic reasons: it benefits from having a weak negotiator in power. For example,
according to ENSB, governments that were installed or supported by the CIA in 1947-1989
were more likely to divert public expenditure in favor of US products. If the citizens are
extremists, however, the US supports the elite for both economic and geopolitical reasons.
The thickness of the gray area, which is equal to |∆W i|+ |∆W F |, measures the probability
of US interventions if µ is distributed uniformly. A look at equations ?? and ?? reveals that
a greater geopolitical importance of H makes US interventions more likely if the citizens
are extremists.
In this simple model, E never intervenes in equilibrium, since it is prevented to do so by
either repression/F ’s interventions, or the surrender of power. However, in circumstances
in which repression/F ’s interventions are motivated by the need to stave off an intervention
by E, one could still say that H is contested between the two foreign countries. From the
description of the SPE in the Appendix, it is easy to see that the threat of an intervention
by E exists only if ideology is extreme.12 So, while H may be intervened in by F for a range
of ideological preferences, it may be contested only in extreme cases. This result suggests
that we should observe powerful countries intervene in countries that are economically
dependent on them, with relatively little interference from other powerful countries. As I
discuss in Section 4, this may help explain why the USA, Britain, France, and the USSR
concentrated their interventions in specific spheres of influence during the 20th century.
In the example just described, regime change only leads to a change in alignment to
the USSR, and the country is contested between the two superpowers, if the citizens are
extremist. However, the history of the Cold War provides many examples of regimes that
posed a geopolitical threat to the West, despite the fact that their supporters were not
extremist leftists. In an extension included in the working paper version of the paper
(Bonfatti 2015), I show that, if rents conceded to F in the past are hard to renegotiate
12If ξ ∈ (ξ, ξ), it is ∆WE = 0, and E’s equilibrium strategy prescribes mE = 0 always.
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(for example, because this would damage F ’s reputation), i may have an incentive to grant
unilateral rents to F before regime change may occur. This may happen when i gains
more from an agreement than c, and can then commit not to renegotiate a high level of
rents that c would instead re-negotiate. When i grants such rents, regime change always
leads to a change in alignment, since c prefers to sign a suboptimal agreement with E,
than to ratify high pre-existing rents. What is interesting about this case is that even a
moderate c becomes a geopolitical threat to F , due to her strong economic nationalism.
A greater geopolitical importance of H, then, makes not only radical but also moderate
political transitions less likely. As I argue in the next section, this result may help explain
the negative impact of the Cold War on democratisation in the 1960s and 1970s.
One line space
4. Foreign interventions and regime change in the 20th century.
One line space
I now interpret some of the broad patterns of foreign interventions in the 20th century in
light of the model developed in previous sections. In Online Appendix A (available on the
author’s website), I look at the experience of a few countries in greater detail.
The majority of 20th century interventions were conducted by a handful of countries:
the USA, Britain, France, the USSR, and China. A cursory look at these interventions
immediately reveals a first pattern: these powerful states did not intervene at random
around the world, but tended to focus on specific areas, often called their “spheres of
influence.” One major exception was that of Cold War interventions, when countries in one
bloc often interfered in the sphere of influence of countries in the other bloc. I return to
this latter point below.
By and large, developing countries were affiliated to the sphere of influence of their main
economic partner. This is particularly evident in the changing affiliation of Latin America, a
region with a longer history of foreign interventions than Africa or Asia (excluding colonial
interventions). Until the second half of the 19th century, Britain, France and Germany
were Latin America’s main economic partners, and also the countries that most often sent
gunboats to the Latin American shores. However, as Latin America re-oriented its economy
towards the US after 1890, it came under increasing US influence. By the end of WWI the
US was the most influential country in Central America, and by the end of the 1920s this
extended to most of South America as well (Coatsworth 2010, p. 202). Having established
Latin America as its sphere of influence, the US became very active in this region. For
example, between 1948 and 1990, it “... secured the overthrow of at least twenty-four
governments [...], four by direct use of US military force, three by means of CIA-managed
revolts or assassination, and seventeen by encouraging local military and political forces to
intervene without direct US participation, usually through military coups d’etat”(Ibid., p.
220). The US’s priority right of intervention in Latin America became tacitly accepted by
other Western powers, although it was challenged by the USSR after 1959.
As Africa and Asia became independent of colonial control, they soon became affiliated
to the spheres of influence of their former colonizers, which were typically also their main
economic partners. Just like the US was very active in Latin America, Britain and France
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became very active in their former empires. Between 1959 and 1979, France undertook
18 military interventions in black Africa, to count only the major ones (Luckham 1982,
p. 61). France was also by far the largest supplier of weapons to francophone Africa, and
maintained a significant military presence in many of its former colonies for decades after
independence (Luckham 1982, pp. 57, 62). Similarly, Britain intervened 17 times in 15
former colonies in Africa, the Middle East and Asia in the 1960s, while in the 1970s her
military interventions concentrated on Sub-Saharan Africa (van Wingen and Tillema 1980,
p. 294; Rouvez 1994, p. 26). At the same time, the other Western powers largely refrained
from interfering, unless a co-ordinated action was explicitly requested (Schraeder 2000, pp.
398-399; van Wingen and Tillema 1980, p. 295).13
Most often, foreign interventions were meant to prevent, or reverse, instances of regime
change that posed a threat to the dominant power’s investments. Early examples of this
second pattern are provided by US interventions in Central America. Between 1898 and
1934, the US intervened in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua
and Panama, often leaving a long-standing military presence in the country subject to
intervention. These interventions were meant to re-establish domestic political stability,
preventing the rise of insurgent movements that put US property at risk (e.g. Thomas
1971, p. 477).
Later examples are Guatemala (1954) and Iran (1953). In Guatemala, the new regime
inaugurated by the Arbenz government (1950-1954) launched an ambitious program of
economic reforms, which included the expropriation of the vast land holdings of United
Fruit, the US company. Within a few years, a CIA-orchestrated coup overthrew Arbenz,
bringing the country back to a series of conservative military governments that lasted until
the 1990s.14 In Iran, the election of Mossaddeq in 1951 marked a significant change in
political regime, leading to greater domestic redistribution and a reduction in the privi-
leges of Anglo-Iranian, the British oil company. In reaction, a British-US supported coup
overthrew Mossaddeq in 1953, replacing him with a new government that quickly adopted
more conciliatory measures towards Anglo-Iranian.
A similar pattern can be observed in French interventions. Upon obtaining indepen-
dence, various former French colonies (Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Chad,
Madagascar and Senegal) gave France privileged access to strategic raw materials. Accord-
ing to Luckham (1982, p. 69), all of France’s major interventions in Africa in the 1970s
(including the Central African Republic and Chad) took place in situations where regime
change represented a threat to the privileges of French investors.
13The US, Britain, and France were not the only countries to frequently engage in foreign interventions.
Belgium was another very interventionist former colonizer, with interventions in the Congo, Rwanda and
Burundi. The USSR was also very active, with a special focus on countries of Eastern Europe whose
economies were tightly linked to its own. And while China’s interventions were more erratic in the 1960s
and 1970s - apparently being driven mostly by the desire to favor anti-imperialism - she is currently
adopting an assertive role in Africa, a continent that is becoming increasingly connected to the Chinese
economy.
14The historical literature clearly points to a direct link between the expropriation of US investments
and the 1954 coup (e.g. Olson 1979; Cockcroft 1996). In a recent paper, Dube, Kaplan and Naidu (2011)
find evidence of this link in the abnormal performance of United Fruit’s shares in the days before the coup.
In summary, foreign interventions mattered, and they selectively supported governments
who could be trusted to be generous towards foreign investors. But what kind of govern-
ments were these? Aidt and Albornoz (2011) emphasize the role of local elite, who owned
assets complementary to foreign capital and had thus an interest in being generous towards
it. While this mechanism was important in some cases, there is evidence that Western in-
terventions also favored groups with strong trade links with the foreign country, or groups
that benefited disproportionately from the foreign country’s financial support.15 For exam-
ple, in Central America, the US supported an elite of exporters of tropical products, for
which the US was the key market. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Britain and France intervened
in favor of a bureaucratic and military elite (Berman 1974, p. 8). This derived its income
from government revenues that ultimately relied on continued access to foreign markets for
key national exports, and on foreign loans and aid. In addition, the African armies were
highly dependent on the former colonizers for arms, training, advisers and basic military
doctrine, and were, as a consequence, particularly sensitive to external pressure (Berman
1974, p. 7). Online Appendix A provides further examples.
Where foreign investments attracted foreign interventions, they also shaped the domestic
politics of regime change. Economic nationalism, or “anti-imperialism” was, in most of
these countries, an additional force behind the struggle for regime change. In other words,
the opposition did not want to go to power only to implement redistribution, but also
to reverse policies deemed too generous towards foreign investments. While this third
pattern has been given little attention by the economics literature, it played a crucial role
in countries with large stocks of foreign investments (I consider the cases of Cuba, Chile
and Venezuela in Online Appendix A).
The analysis conducted in Section 3 suggests one way to explain these patterns from eco-
nomic fundamentals. The US, Britain and France, were each the main trade partner - and
main source of financial support - of a group of developing countries. Proposition 1, then,
suggests why these developing countries became divided into spheres of influence: their
economic links to the established power were simply too strong, for an external power to
be able to compete. Within their spheres of influence, the Western countries could extract
rents for their investors, but the more so, the weaker was their counterpart in negotiations.
This naturally induced them to support governments with direct links to their trade or
financial support. Opposite calculations motivated economic nationalism, which pushed
against these governments. Proposition 1 explains the importance of economic national-
ism with the fact that developing countries were very dependent on economic agreements
with the established power (high γ), and gains from an agreement unequally distributed
(high θi and θc). Literally, the proposition suggests that economic nationalism should have
facilitated regime change: this may fit the case of Venezuela, a country where economic
nationalism was a driving force behind the transition to democracy in the 1960s and 1970s
(see Online Appendix A).
15Complementarity between local and foreign capital is also less likely to be important in countries where
foreign investments are located in secluded enclaves (e.g. capital-intensive mines), their main link with the
rest of the economy being through taxation.
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The extension outlined at the end of Section 3 provides some further insights. In an envi-
ronment such as that of the early 20th century, where the West had lucrative investments
in many developing countries, it might be hard for the Western governments to accept
expropriation in one country, lest the other would follow suit. The incumbent elites would
then have an incentive to concede even larger rents, to further differentiate themselves from
the more economically nationalist opposition groups. In these cases, economic nationalism
might represent not only an economic threat, but also a threat to the logic of the spheres
of influence. This mechanism must have played a particularly important role during the
Cold War, when geopolitical competition intensified. However in this period, ideological
preferences were also important. To these issues I now turn.
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4.2. The Cold War.
During the Cold War, the groups that the West sought to exclude from power began to
receive the support of the USSR and its allies. This led to an escalation of the domestic
conflict, which in some extreme cases (such as Vietnam) degenerated into proxy wars
between the two superpowers. With insight, this is probably what Kwame Nkrumah - the
first prime minister of independent Ghana - was hoping to avoid when, addressing the UN
General Assembly in 1958, he urged the newly-independent African countries to remain
non-aligned in the Cold War (Latham 2010, p. 258).
Cold War competition for the alignment of developing countries peaked in the 1960s and
1970s, largely due to evolutions in Soviet foreign policy.16 It was in this phase that the USSR
began to intervene in Latin America, Asia and Africa, with a view to install friendly groups
in power and thus create international support for its broader Cold War goals. The impact
of this escalation on regime change is particularly evident in the case of Latin America,
a region with a long history of foreign interventions, but where democratization was well
underway in the 1950s.18 From 1959 onwards, the USSR supported the Cuban revolution,
leading to one of the most serious violation of the logic of the spheres of influence in the 20th
century. This was a turning point. In subsequent years, the urge to avoid a “second Cuba”
led to a scaling up of US interventions in support of the ruling elite, and against the ongoing
political transition. Since the transition was taking the form of democratization, the effect
16During Stalin’s rule, the USSR’s central concern was “to keep and to digest its principal war gains
- control over Eastern Europe - while avoiding a premature collision with the ascending Western power,
America”(Brzezinski 1992, p. 35).17 Soviet foreign policy took a new turn only with Khrushchev’s accession
to power (1958). In this year, a distinctively new phase started, one in which, for the Soviets, “Eurasia was
still the central stake but no longer the central front”, “containment was to be defeated by encirclement”
(Ibid. 1992, p. 38). This phase lasted roughly until the end of the 1970s, when the looming crisis of the
Soviet economy and the disastrous invasion of Afghanistan (1979) induced the Soviet leadership to pursue
a less aggressive foreign policy.
18Throughout the first half of the century, a landed and commercial elite had retained power in Latin
America, sometimes with the help of US interventions. However from the 1920s onwards, a large number
of reformist parties were formed (see Angell 1994), most of which were committed to gaining power by
means of fair elections. These parties came to power in Guatemala (1945), Venezuela (1944), Costa Rica
(1948), Bolivia (1952), and elsewhere. Because of this, the 1950s were perceived as a period of political
transition in Latin America.
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of the Cold War was to bias US foreign policy against democracy in the 1960s and 1970s.
Many US interventions of this period were aimed at removing democratically elected leaders
(such as Chile’s Allende in 1973), or at supporting undemocratic ones. While the USSR
also scaled up the resources available to the opposition, the superior resources committed
by the US to the defense of its “own” hemisphere implied that the democratization process
came to a halt.
This pattern is illustrated in Figure 3, which plots the average Polity IV democracy
score of the Southern and Central American countries (measured on the left) together with
ENSB’s measure of the number of American countries intervened in by the CIA in each
year (measured on the right).19 There was a clear upward trend in the quality of democracy
in the 1950s, but this suffered a sharp reversal in the 1960s and 1970s, at the same time
as a sharp increase in the number of CIA interventions. In the 1980s, the number of CIA
interventions dropped, and the quality of democracy began to improve again. This pattern
is consistent with ESB’s finding that CIA interventions were detrimental to democracy, but
it also illustrates how the timing of interventions depended on the intensity of Cold War
competition.
Figure 3 ideally here.
FIGURE 3 CIA interventions and democracy in Latin America, 1945-1989. Sources: Polity IV
(democracy), ENSB (CIA interventions)
Despite Nkrumah’s pleas, the Cold War had a similar escalating effect in Africa and
Asia. There, the USSR fuelled the opposition to regimes that were friendly to former
19This is the number of American countries where, in a given year, the CIA either installed or supported
a government leader. A similarly sharp increase in CIA interventions is evident if we use ENSB’s narrow
measure of covert CIA interventions; see ENSB’s for more details.
23
colonizers, or supported regimes that antagonized the former colonizers. Among the latter
are Ethiopia (1974), Angola (1975), Mozambique (1975), Vietnam (1976) and Iran (1979).
It was mainly because of the geopolitical aspects of regime change that the US intervened
alongside Britain and France in their spheres of influence in Africa during the Cold War
(see, for example, Shraeder 2000).20
Why did intensification of the Cold War lead the West to more firmly oppose the political
transition in developing countries, and thus democracy? The analysis conducted in previous
sections provides two possible answers. Suppose we can capture the escalation of the 1960s
and 1970s with a scaling up of γF and γE. Then, maybe, the groups who would benefit
from the political transition were, by and large, extremist communists (ξ ≥ ξ), who could
not be trusted to align themselves with the West. Indeed, quite a few of the countries where
regime change took place - such as Cuba, Chile and Nicaragua - turned to the Soviets for
economic assistance. According to Proposition 1, then, the Cold War should precisely lead
to more frequent interventions by the West, and to a lower probability of regime change.
While this explanation may be valid for a number of countries, it may not be the whole
story. For one thing, not many opposition groups had a clear communist ideology: in terms
of the model, ξ was low. Of course the West liked to portray the regimes they opposed
as communist. But so little motivated appear some of these claims (as in the case of the
Dominican Republic),21 to induce historians and political scientists to conclude that US
policy-makers acted irrationally, or “suffered from a kind of anti-Communist malaise or
imperial hubris” (Latham 2010, p. 221). Even among governments who did receive Soviet
assistance, “While many [...] embraced radical economic policies, the vast majority of them
were not Marxist states. Many of them also declared their firm commitment to policies
of non-alignment and even suppressed local Communist parties” (Latham 2010, p. 265).
This was true in Castro’s Cuba and Nasser’s Egypt;22 in Allende’s Chile, the government
leaders were indeed communist, but could hold on to power only with the support of non-
communist allies. In fact, so often did the USSR accept non-communist allies, that the
Soviet leadership came under criticism for this at home.23
That ideology can fully explain the pattern of Cold War interventions seems particularly
hard to believe, given the importance of the West as an economic partner for many devel-
oping countries, and the superior resource that the West devoted to the defence of its own
spheres of influence. For example, Coatsworth (2010, p. 201) argues that “In its prosecu-
tion of the Cold War in the Third World, the United States enjoyed formidable advantages
20One difference between Latin America and Africa was that, whereas in the former the Iron Curtain
fell mostly along the divide between traditional elites and masses, in Africa it also fell along ethnic and
other historical divides.
21In 1965, the Johnson administration invaded the Dominican Republic to remove Juan Bosch, a demo-
cratically elected leader. Although the evidence of Communist activity among the pro-Bosh forces was
very thin, Johnson concluded that the risk of subversion was simply intolerable (Latham 2010, p. 271).
22The latter fought Communism at home, and even spread an anti-Communist campaign into Syria and
Iraq, accusing the Soviets of hindering the cause of Arab unity and interfering in internal Arab affairs.
23That was the accusation levelled at Kruschev in the 1960s. According to Latham (2010), China’s
Cold War interventions showed an even stronger degree of ideological flexibility, putting great emphasis on
anti-imperialism.
24
over its Soviet rival. Economic strength gave US leaders a decided financial and material
advantage over the Soviets.” Indeed, the US embargo on Cuba (1962-) inflicted large and
long-standing costs on the Cuban economy, despite Soviet assistance. This stands in sharp
contrast with the experience of the progressive governments who managed to remain in
good terms with the US, and received massive amounts of aid in return.24 In summary,
while a strong pro-Soviet ideology was not frequent, the economic incentives to remain with
the West were clear and strong: in terms of the model, ξ was high, because both γ and γF
and γE were high.
The extension outlined at the of Section 3 provides an alternative interpretation. If
Western rents, once established, were hard to renegotiate, the elite had an incentive to
grant even more of them, and even a non-communist opposition could become a geopolit-
ical threat. That was because of economic nationalism: the opposition really wanted to
expropriate Western rents, and, in the face of Western intransigence, were willing to turn
to the USSR to reach that goal.
Consistently with this alternative interpretation, many of the governments that turned
to the USSR or China for economic assistance seem to have been motivated more by
the desire to eliminate the West’s domination of their economy, than by their communist
ideology. This was the case of the Castro government, but economic nationalism can also
explain why Allende was able to secure enough domestic support (see Online Appendix
A). There is clear evidence that, for these and other governments, the issue of foreign
investments was a stumbling block in the way of friendly relations with the West. There is
also evidence that reputation concerns played a role: sometimes, Western strategists would
have liked to accommodate on the expropriation of foreign investments, but had their hands
tied by the reputation concerns of domestic lobbies.25 Finally, there is evidence that, in
the 1950s and 1960s, the elite-led governments continued to grant very generous terms to
Western investors, adding up to the large rents inherited from the pre-Cold War period.
The extension outlined at the of Section 3 suggests why this was a rational self-preservation
strategy, despite the fact that it fuelled economic nationalism at home.
In both interpretations, the model suggests that a scaling up of γF and γE should result
in a lower probability of regime change, and, for some distribution of µ, an increased
frequency of Western interventions. These predictions fit the pattern of Figure 3 well.
As the Cold War drew to a close in the 1980s, developing countries lost much of their
geopolitical importance. As illustrated in Figure 3, this resulted in a sharp drop of US
interventions in Latin America. At the same time, the democratization process that had
24For example, the Frei government in Chile and the Betacourt governments in Venezuela. For more
details on US aid to Latin America in the 1960s, see Taffet (2007).
25An example of this is the famous Hickenlooper Amendment, a law passed in 1962 with which Congress
made it mandatory for the President to cut aid to countries that expropriated American companies. The
Amendment was intended to establish a reputation of intransigence towards renegotiation, and was pre-
cisely pushed through by Congress to prevent the President from sacrificing the interests of US investors
to broader geopolitical calculations. In fact, according to Vandevelde (1988), electoral incentives make
Congress particularly keen on imposing sanctions against the expropriation of US companies, whereas the
President may be more concerned with the foreign policy consequences of sanctions.
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been interrupted in the early 1960s resumed in the 1980s. In Africa, it resumed in the early
1990s. The transition to democracy was largely supported by the West, who proved able
to entertain good economic relations with whoever went to power. In terms of the model,
γF and γE went back to a low value in the 1980s. This resulted in a lower geopolitical
cost of international disruption. At the same time, it resulted in a lower probability that
c’s economic nationalism would lead to international disruption, since c’s outside option
had became less attractive. Both factors reduced the willingness of the West to intervene
in support of the status quo, forcing the elite to make concessions. As put by Coatsworth
(2010), after the end of the Cold War, contenders were simply compelled to negotiate peace
in the context of Western hegemony.
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5. Conclusion.
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I have constructed an economic theory of foreign interventions and regime change, which
may help explain several patterns of Western interventions in the 20th century. My results
may help explain why the Cold War had such a radicalising effect on foreign interventions
and regime change in the 1960s and 1970s, even in countries for which the West was a key
economic partner and where the opposition did not have a strong communist ideology. More
in general, they may help interpret how the West’s preference for democracy is determined
by its economic links with the country in question, and by the current level of geopolitical
competition.
I conclude by discussing two possible extensions. First, suppose that the ruling elite has
an option to undertake reforms that would help the economy grow (for example, by creating
good economic institutions). Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) suggest that the elite is
unlikely to do so, since economic success would put external groups in a position to threaten
the elite’s supremacy. In the context of my model, there would be an additional reason
why this would be true: by creating more links between the masses and the international
economy, the reforms could weaken the special position of the elite in F ’s preferences.
Notice that this effect of reforms would be positive for F , since it would reduce the risks
associated with regime change. This may explain why, in the 1950s and 1960s, US aid was
primarily aimed at promoting modernization, which was seen as a way to prevent the inroad
of communism (Latham 2010). The diverging incentives of the elite and F suggest that
there may be more to learn about the efficacy of development aid when donor countries
may also be involved in regime change.26
A second, somewhat symmetric extension would be to consider the case of nationalistic
new democracies.27 A new democracy representing less outward-oriented masses may want
to reduce the influence of domestic groups with strong economic links with a powerful for-
eign country. This may involve the adoption of inefficient “closeness” policies, or forced
26For example, US aid entirely missed its modernization goals in the 1950s and 1960s. At least in
part, this was because the elite blocked US-sponsored development, while red-baiting the opposition and
diverting US aid to the fighting of communism. Because of this failure, in the 1970s US aid became much
more oriented towards supporting friendly regimes (Latham 2010).
27I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension.
26
diversification in favor of other countries. For example, this seems to be the current strat-
egy of some Latin American countries (Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela), which are quite
inimical to the US and its allies, but quite keen on diversifying towards China or Iran. The
governments of these countries are also deeply suspicious towards other leftist governments
that are successfully pursuing a modernization strategy, such as Brazil or Chile (Russell
2011). Little is known about what determines the choice between these two paths, and
how each country’s history of foreign interventions may be relevant. I believe this may be
an important area for future research.
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6. Appendix.
One line space
6.1. Full description of the SPE.
Proposition A1 describes the SPE of the overall game. For the SPE of the subgame that
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starts after i has not surrendered power, drop the first three lines (until “... phase of stage
4”).
Because I do not commit to specific tie-breaking rules in stages 2 and 3, players have
best-response correspondences rather than functions. However, I find that, for some of the
histories that put them at a tie, players have a unique best response that is consistent
with the strategies of players who move at an earlier stage being well-defined. Because all
strategies must be well defined at a SPE, strategies must feature such best-response at a
SPE.
Let R be an indicator function for c staging a revolution. Then:
One line space
Proposition A1. In a pure strategy SPE, in t = 1, i surrenders power if µ ≤ ∆W ,
does not surrender power otherwise. If i surrenders power, the game moves directly to
the bargaining phase of stage 4. If i does not surrender power, if ξ ≥ 1−θi−θc
2
γ (so that
∆W F ≤ 0, ∆WE ≥ 0):
t = 2.i : i sets m = ∆W c,F,E − µ if µ ∈
(
∆W,∆W c,F,E
]
, m = 0 if µ /∈
[
∆W,∆W c,F,E
]
. If
µ = ∆W , may set m = 0 or m = −∆W i.
t = 2.ii : F sets mF = ∆W c,E − m − µ if µ ∈
(
∆W c,F,E −m,∆W c,E −m
]
, mF = 0 if
µ /∈
[
∆W c,F,E −m,∆W c,E −m
]
. Suppose µ = ∆W c,F,E −m. If m ∈ [0,−∆W i), F
sets mF = −∆W F ; for any other history, may set mF = 0 or mF = −∆W F .
t = 2.iii : E sets mE = ∆W c −m−mF − µ if µ ∈
[
∆W c −m−mF ,∆W c,E −m−mF
)
,
mE = 0 if µ /∈
[
∆W c −m−mF ,∆W c,E −m−mF
]
. Suppose µ = ∆W c,E−m−mF .
If mF ∈ [0,−∆W F ), or if mF = −∆W F and m ∈ [0,−∆W i), E sets mE = 0; for
any other history, may set mE = 0 or mE = −∆WE.
t = 3 : c sets R = 1 if µ < ∆W c −m −mF −mE, R = 0 if µ > ∆W c −m −mF −mE.
Suppose µ = ∆W c−m−mF−mE. If ∆WE > 0, and mE ∈
(
−∆WE, 0
]
, c sets R = 1;
if ∆WE = 0, and either mF ∈ [0,−∆W F ), or mF = −∆W F and m ∈ [0,−∆W i),
she sets R = 0; for any other history, may set R = 1 or R = 0.
and the game then moves to the bargaining phase of stage 4. If ξ < 1−θi−θc
2
γ (so that
∆W F > 0, ∆WE ≤ 0), instead:
t = 2.i : i sets m = ∆W c,F,E−µ if µ ∈
(
∆W,∆W c,F,E
]
, sets m = 0 if µ /∈
[
∆W,∆W c,F,E
]
.
If µ = ∆W , may set m = 0 or m = −∆W i.
t = 2.ii : F sets mF = ∆W c,E −m− µ if µ ∈
[
∆W c,E −m,∆W c,F,E −m
)
, sets mF = 0 if
µ /∈
[
∆W c,E −m,∆W c,F,E −m
]
. Suppose µ = ∆W c,F,E −m. If m ∈ [0,−∆W i), F
sets mF = 0; for any other history, may set mF = 0 or mF = −∆W F .
t = 2.iii : E sets mE = ∆W c −m−mF − µ if µ ∈
(
∆W c,E −m−mF ,∆W c −m−mF
]
,
mE = 0 if µ /∈
[
∆W c,E −m−mF ,∆W c −m−mF
]
. Suppose µ = ∆W c,E−m−mF .
If mF ∈ (−∆W F , 0], E sets mE = 0; for any other history, may set mE = 0 or
mE = −∆WE.
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t = 3 : c sets R = 1 if µ < ∆W c −m −mF −mE, R = 0 if µ > ∆W c −m −mF −mE.
Suppose µ = ∆W c − m − mF − mE. If ∆WE < 0 and mE ∈
[
0,−∆WE
)
, c sets
R = 0; if ∆WE = 0 and mF ∈
(
−∆W F , 0
]
, she sets R = 1; for any other history,
may set R = 1 or R = 0.
and the game then moves to the bargaining phase of stage 4.
Proof. I begin by looking at the SPE of the subgame that starts after i has not surrender
power. Suppose ξ ≥ 1−θi−θc
2
γ. It is one of the following: ∆W F = ∆WE = 0 (if ξ =
1−θi−θc
2
γ); ∆W F < 0, ∆WE = 0 (if ξ ∈
(
1−θi−θc
2
γ, ξ
)
); or ∆W F < 0, ∆WE > 0 (if
ξ ≥ ξ). Solve backward. Stage 3. If µ < ∆W c − m − mF − mE, c’s unique optimal
action is R = 1. If µ > ∆W c − m − mF − mE, her unique optimal action is R = 0.
If µ = ∆W c − m − mF − mE, both R = 0 and R = 1 are optimal actions. But if
∆WE > 0, and mE ∈ (−∆WE, 0], R = 0 cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy,
since E’s optimal strategy would then not be well defined.28 Similarly, if ∆WE = 0,
and either mF ∈ [0,−∆W F ), or mF = −∆W F and m ∈ [0,−∆W i), R = 1 cannot be
part of an equilibrium strategy, since the optimal strategy of F (in the first case) or i (in
the second case) would then not be well defined.29 Stage 2.iii. If ∆WE = 0, E’s optimal
strategy must prescribemE = 0 always. Indeed, this is what the strategy in the proposition
prescribes. If ∆WE > 0, if µ < ∆W c − m − mF , E’s unique optimal action is mE = 0
(enough to have R = 1). If µ ∈
[
∆W c −m−mF ,∆W c,E −m−mF
)
, E’s unique optimal
action is mE = ∆W c −m −mF − µ: it is the cheapest way to trigger R = 1, and yields
∆WE − |mE| > 0. If µ = ∆W c,E −m−mF , depending on c’s tie-breaking rule, E may or
may not be at at tie. If c’s tie-breaking rule when mE = −∆WE is R = 0, E is not at a
tie, and her unique optimal action is mE = 0; if c’s rule is R = 1, E is at a tie, and both
28Suppose c’s strategy prescribed R = 0 given this history. One step back, if µ ∈[
∆W c −m−mF ,∆W c,E −m−mF
)
, E’s optimal action would be mE = ∆W c −m−mF − µ− ǫ, with
ǫ > 0 infinitesimally small (it is the cheapest way to obtain R = 1, and one that yields ∆WE − |mE | > 0).
E’s optimal strategy would then not be well defined.
29In both cases, ∆WE = 0 implies that E’s strategy must prescribe mE = 0 always. The first history
implies ∆WF < 0. Suppose c’s strategy prescribed R = 1 given the first history. Two steps back,
if µ ∈
(
∆W c,F −m,∆W c −m
]
, F ’s optimal action would be mF = ∆W c − m − µ + ǫ, with ǫ > 0
infinitesimally small (it is the cheapest way to obtain R = 0, and one that yields −∆WF − mF > 0).
F ’s optimal strategy would then not be well defined. Suppose c’s strategy prescribed R = 1 given the
second history. There are two cases, ∆WF = 0 and ∆WF < 0. If ∆WF = 0, F ’s strategy must
prescribe mF = 0 = −∆WF always. Three steps back, if µ ∈
(
∆W c,i,∆W c
]
, i’s optimal action would be
m = −∆W c − µ + ǫ, with ǫ > 0 infinitesimally small (it is the cheapest way to obtain R = 0, and one
that yields −∆W i −m > 0). i’s optimal strategy would then not be well defined. Suppose ∆WF < 0.
Since c’s strategy prescribes R = 1 given the second history, two steps back, F ’s optimal strategy must
prescribe mF = 0 when µ = ∆W c,F −m and m ∈ [0,−∆W i) (since even mF = −∆WF would only lead
to R = 1). In addition, in light of the fact that c’s strategy must prescribe R = 0 given the first history,
F ’s strategy must prescribe mF = ∆W c−m−µ if µ ∈
(
∆W c,F −m,∆W c −m
]
(it is the cheapest way to
trigger mE = 0 and thus R = 0, and one that yields −∆WF −mF > 0). It follows that, three steps back,
if µ ∈
(
∆W i,c,F ,∆W c,F
]
, i’s optimal action would be m = ∆W c,F −µ+ ǫ, with ǫ > 0 infinitesimally small
(it is the cheapest way to trigger mF = ∆W c−m−µ and thus R = 0, and one that yields −∆W i−m > 0).
i’s optimal strategy would then not be well defined.
30
mE = 0 (leading to R = 0) and mE = −∆WE (leading to R = 1) are optimal actions.
But if mF ∈ [0,−∆W F ), or if mF = −∆W F and m ∈ [0,−∆W i), mE = −∆WE cannot
be part of an equilibrium strategy, since the optimal strategy of F (in the first case) or i
(in the second case) would not be well defined.30 If µ > ∆W c,E − m − mF , E’s unique
optimal action is mE = 0 (since to have R = 1 would cost more than ∆WE). Stage 2.ii. If
∆W F = 0, F ’s optimal strategy must prescribe mF = 0 always. Indeed, this is what the
strategy in the proposition prescribes. If ∆W F < 0, if µ > ∆W c,E−m, F ’s unique optimal
action is mF = 0 (enough to have mE = 0 and R = 0). If µ ∈
(
∆W c,F,E −m,∆W c,E −m
]
,
F ’s unique optimal action ismF = ∆W c,E−m−µ: it is the cheapest way to triggermE = 0
and thus R = 0, and yields −∆W F−mF > 0. Next, suppose µ = ∆W c,F,E−m. Depending
on c’s and E’s tie-breaking rules, F may or may not be at a tie. If c’s tie-breaking rule
given mF = −∆W F and mE = −∆WE is R = 1, and, at the same time, E’s tie-breaking
rule given mF = −∆W F is mE = −∆WE, then F is not at a tie, and its unique optimal
action is mF = 0. Notice that this condition does not hold if m ∈ [0,−∆W i), since the tie-
breaking rules of either E or c are required to be different. If the condition does not hold,
F is at a tie, and both mF = 0 (leading to R = 1) or mF = −∆W F (leading to R = 0)
are optimal actions. But if m ∈ [0,−∆W i), mF = 0 cannot be part of an equilibrium
strategy, since i’s strategy would then not be well defined.31 If µ < ∆W c,F,E − m, F ’s
unique optimal strategy is mF = 0 (since to have R = 0 would cost more than −∆W F ).
Stage 2.i. If µ > ∆W c,F,E, i’s unique optimal action is m = 0 (enough to have mE and
R = 0, possibly by triggering mF > 0). If µ ∈
(
∆W,∆W c,F,E
]
, i’s unique optimal action
is m = ∆W c,F,E − µ: it is the cheapest way to trigger mF = −∆W F and thus mE = 0
and R = 0, and yields −∆W i − m > 0. Next, suppose µ = ∆W . Depending on c’s
and E’s and F ’s tie-breaking rules, i may or may not be at a tie. If ∆W F < 0, and F ’s
strategy prescribes mF = 0 when µ = ∆W c,F,E −m and m = −∆W i (either because the
tie-breaking rules of c and E make this F ’s optimal action, or because F ’s own tie-breaking
rule prescribes this), or if ∆W F = 0, and c’s tie-breaking rule is R = 1 when m = −∆W i,
then i is not at a tie, and her unique optimal action is m = 0. Otherwise, i is at a tie, and
30Suppose E’s strategy prescribed mE = −∆WE given the first history. One step back, if µ ∈(
∆W c,F,E −m,∆W c,E −m
]
, F ’s optimal action would be mF = ∆W c,E − m − µ + ǫ, with ǫ > 0 in-
finitesimally small (it is the cheapest way to trigger mE = 0 and thus R = 0, and one that yields
−∆WF −mF > 0). F ’s optimal strategy would then not be well defined. Suppose E’s strategy prescribed
mE = −∆WE given the second history. One step back, F ’s optimal strategy would have to prescribe
mF = 0 when µ = ∆W c,E,F − m and m ∈ [0,−∆W i) (since even mF = −∆WF would only lead to
mE = −∆WE and R = 1). At the same time, in light of the fact that E’s strategy must prescribe mE = 0
given the first history, F ’s strategy must prescribemF = ∆W c,E−m−µ if µ ∈
(
∆W c,F,E −m,∆W c,E −m
]
(it is the cheapest way to trigger mE = 0 and thus R = 0, and one that yields −∆WF − mF > 0). It
follows that, two steps back, if µ ∈
(
∆W,∆W c,F,E
]
, i’s optimal action would be m = ∆W c,F,E − µ + ǫ,
with ǫ > 0 infinitesimally small (it is the cheapest way to trigger mF = ∆W c,E −m−µ, and thus mE = 0
and R = 0, and one that yields ∆W i −m > 0). i’s optimal strategy would then not be well defined.
31Suppose F ’s strategy prescribed mF = 0 given this history. One step back, if µ ∈
(
∆W,∆W c,F,E
]
, i’s
optimal action would be m = ∆W c,F,E − µ + ǫ, with ǫ > 0 infinitesimally small (it is the cheapest way
to trigger mF = −∆WF and thus mE = 0 and R = 0, and one that yields −∆W i −m > 0). i’s optimal
strategy would then not be well defined.
31
both m = 0 (leading to R = 0) and m = −∆W i (leading to R = 1) are optimal actions. If
µ < ∆W , i’s unique optimal action is m = 0 (since to have R = 0 would cost more than
−∆W i). Suppose ξ < 1−θi−θc
2
γ. The proof proceeds in a similar fashion, and is relegated to
Online Appendix B5. Having derived the SPE of the subgame that starts after i does not
surrender power, consider i’s optimal strategy in Stage 1. If µ > ∆W , i’s unique optimal
action is not to surrender power (since this leads to R = 0, at a cost less than −∆W i to i).
If µ < ∆W , i is indifferent between surrendering power or not (since the latter would lead
to m = 0 and R = 1). By assumption (see Section 2.1), i surrenders power. If µ = ∆W , i
is again indifferent between surrendering power or not (since the latter would lead to either
m = 0 and R = 1, or to m = −∆W i and R = 0). Again, by assumption, i surrenders
power.
QED
One line space
6.2. Proofs.
Proof to Lemma 1. The proof builds on Proposition A1. The verb “imply” is used as
shorthand for “by the strategy described in Proposition A1, imply.” Suppose i does not
surrender power in t = 1. Suppose ξ ≥ 1−θi−θc
2
γ. If µ > ∆W c,E, it is µ > ∆W c,E ≥
∆W c,F,E, implying m = 0. It is then µ > ∆W c,E−m, implying mF = 0; µ > ∆W c,E−m−
mF , implying mE = 0; and µ > ∆W c,E −m−mF −mE ≥ ∆W c−m−mF −mE, implying
R = 0. The case µ ∈ (∆W c,F,E,∆W c,E] only applies if ∆W F < 0. It is µ > ∆W c,F,E,
implying m = 0. It is then µ ∈
(
∆W c,F,E −m,∆W c,E −m
]
, implying mF = ∆W c,E−m−
µ = ∆W c,E − µ; and µ = ∆W c,E −m −mF , implying mE = 0 (given the history: mF ∈[
0,−∆W F
)
). As for c’s equilibrium action, if ∆WE > 0, it is µ > ∆W c −m−mF −mE,
implying R = 0; if ∆WE = 0, it is µ = ∆W c − m − mF − mE, implying R = 0 (given
the history: mF ∈
[
0,−∆W F
)
). µ ∈
(
∆W,∆W c,F,E
]
implies m = ∆W c,F,E − µ. It is
then µ = ∆W c,F,E − m, implying mF = −∆W F (given the history: m ∈ [0,−∆W i));
and µ = ∆W c,E − m − mF , implying mE = 0 (given the history: m ∈ [0,−∆W i) and
mF = −∆W F ). As for c’s equilibrium action, if ∆WE > 0, it is µ > ∆W c−m−mF −mE,
implying R = 0; if ∆WE = 0, it is µ = ∆W c − m − mF − mE, implying R = 0 (given
the history: m ∈ [0,−∆W i) and mF = −∆W F ). µ < ∆W implies m = 0. It is then
µ < ∆W −m < ∆W c,F,E −m, implying mF = 0; µ < ∆W −m−mF < ∆W c −m−mF ,
implying mE = 0;32 and µ < ∆W c − m − mF − mE, implying R = 1. µ = ∆W implies
that it is either m = 0 or m = −∆W i. If m = 0, the same logic applies as for µ < ∆W .
Suppose instead m = −∆W i. Clearly, such an action can only be part of an equilibrium
in which E sets mE = 0, and c sets R = 0. But it must also be mF = −∆W F in such an
equilibrium. If ∆W F = 0, this follows immediately from the fact that F ’s strategy must
prescribe mF = 0 = −∆W F always. If ∆W F < 0, suppose it was mF < −∆W F . Then, it
would be µ = ∆W = ∆W c,F,E −m < ∆W c,E −m−mF . This would imply either mE > 0
and R = 1 (if µ > ∆W c −m −mF ), or mE = 0 and R = 1 (if µ ≤ ∆W c −m −mF ), a
contradiction.
32Using equations ?? and ??, it is easy to see that ∆WF,E ≤ 0 if ξ ≥ 1−θi−θc2 γ. This implies ∆W ≤
∆W c,i < ∆W c.
32
Next, suppose ξ < 1−θi−θc
2
γ. µ > ∆W c,F,E implies m = 0. It is then µ > ∆W c,F,E −m,
implying mF = 0; µ > ∆W c,F,E −m −mF > ∆W c −m −mF , implying mE = 0;33 and
µ > ∆W c−m−mF −mE, implying R = 0. µ ∈ (∆W,∆W c,F,E] implies m = ∆W c,F,E−µ.
It is then µ = ∆W c,F,E − m, implying mF = 0 (given the history: m ∈ [0,−∆W i));
µ = ∆W c,F,E−m−mF > ∆W c−m−mF , implyingmE = 0; and µ > ∆W c−m−mF−mE,
implying R = 0. µ < ∆W implies m = 0. There are then two cases. First, if µ ≥ ∆W c,E,
it is µ ≥ ∆W c,E − m, implying mF = ∆W c,E − µ.34 It is then µ = ∆W c,E − m − mF ,
implying mE = 0 (given the history: mF ∈
(
−∆W F , 0
]
). As for c’s action, if ∆WE < 0, it
is µ < ∆W c−m−mF −mE, implying R = 1; if ∆WE = 0, it is µ = ∆W c−m−mF −mE,
implying R = 1 (given the history: mF ∈
(
−∆W F , 0
]
). Second, if µ < ∆W c,E, it is
µ < ∆W c,E−m, implying mF = 0. It is then µ < ∆W c,E−m−mF , implying mE = 0; and
µ < ∆W c,E −m−mF −mE ≤ ∆W c −m−mF −mE, implying R = 1. µ = ∆W implies
that it is either m = 0 or m = −∆W i. If m = 0, the same logic applies as for µ < ∆W .
Suppose m = −∆W i. Such an action can only be part of an equilibrium in which F sets
mF = 0, and c sets R = 0. It is then µ = ∆W > ∆W i,c = ∆W c − m − mF , implying
mE = 0 in equilibrium.
QED
One line space
Proof to Proposition 1. The proof builds on Proposition A1, and on Lemma 1. By the
strategy described in Proposition A1, i surrenders power if µ ≤ ∆W , does not surrender
power otherwise. The rest of the Proposition follows immediately from Lemma 1.
QED
One line space
33Using equations ?? and ??, it is easy to see that ∆WF,E > 0 if ξ < 1−θi−θc2 γ.
34It is always µ ∈
[
∆W c,E −m,∆W c,E,F −m
)
in this case, since ∆W < ∆W c,E,F .
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